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Summary  findings
In the 1980s and  1990s, economic growth (material  lower quality services provided by the state to lower-
progress) became the main development goal under the  income groups.
policies known as the "Washington Consensus." Earlier  Social policies in developing countr ies in the past
concerns about inequalities of income and wealth were  decade have been defined largely in terms of poverty
replaced by policies emphasizing macroeconomic  reduction. Solimano argues that income distribution and
stabilization (reducing inflation and cutting fiscal deficits)  the reduction of social inequality are valid policy targets
and structural reform (trade liberalization, financial  on their own. Empirical evidence and theories of
deregulation, privatization, and a shift to a smaller state).  endogenous growth  emphasize complementarities
But fiscal adjustment and market liberalization alone  between social equity and growth. To the extent that
have not brought stable, equitable development.  social inequality engenders social conflict, invites
Inequality of income and wealth, far from declining,  taxation of physical investments, and induces economic
seem to have increased in Latin America.  populism, it hampers economic growth. Social policies to
The "Washington  Consensus" has supported  social  promote  equitable development shoutd include:
policies that rely on targeting, growth-led poverty  - Good, broad-based education and health services.
reduction,  and delivery of social services partly through  *  Greater access to credit by low-income households
the private sector. Loose ends to this strategy include:  and small-scale producers.
*  Growth patterns that favor skilled labor and  *  More equal access to land and ownership of capital
nonlabor factors of production.  stock (say, after privatization).
* The exclusion of vulnerable groups for whom the  Social safety nets are needed when unemployment,
mnarket  produces little income.  wage cuts, and declining income threaten the poor.
i  Overreliance on commodity-based growth for  Austerity policies without such safety nets as emergency
human development.  employment programs, food distribution to children, and
e  Political manipulation of beneficiaries and weak  minimum income support schemes unduly hurt the poor,
institutional ability to reach targeted groups.  the vulnerable, and the politically weak, making fiscal
*  Higher quality services provided by the private  retrenchment difficult and socially regressive.
sector to high-income and upper-middle-class groups and
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Beyond Unequal Development: An Overview
Andres Solimano
Introduction
In  the  1  940s,  1950s  and  1  960s  development  theory  emphasized  market  failures,
discontinuities, irreversibilities and excessive social inequality.  The dominant  development
paradigm  stressed  the  need  for  the  state  to  create  the  adequate  physical  infrastructure,
institutional and social conditions for development. This would entail implementing large scale
public  investment programs,  planning  and  policies  aimed  at  social  modernization  such  as
education, health, social protection and housing policies.
In the 1980s and 1990s, this paradigm changed.  Development problems were, in a way,
reduced to growth problems; and the lack of sustained growth, particularly in the 1980s in Latin
America, were described to obey, largely, to pervasive state interference in the market process
both internationally through trade protection and nationally through overregulation of goods,
capital and labor markets and extended state-ownership of national productive assets.
Economic growth (material progress) became the main development goal in the policies
known as the Washington Consensus.  Growth was to  be  supported by  (i)  macroeconomic
stabilization -understood  basically as reducing inflation and cutting down fiscal deficits, (ii)
structural reform policies viewed as trade liberalization, financial deregulation, privatization and
a decisive shift to a smaller state.
Previous concerns of development policy on reducing inequalities of income and wealth
were eschewed in favor of an agenda dominated by macro stabilization and liberalization.  The
experience of the  1990s is  showing that  the  combination of  fiscal  adjustment and  market
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liberalization,  although  necessary  policy  steps  to  reduce  macro-imbalances  and  increase
efficiency, are insufficient to bring about stable and equitable development.  Reality is showing
several difficulties of the adjustment and development process underestimated by the policies of
the Washington Consensus, say:  (i) The transition from low inflation to sustained growth and
development is often long; (ii) an excessive emphasis on fiscal adjustment neglected the risks of
premature financial liberalization, (iii) globalization has  increased the  frequency, scope  and
severity  of  financial  and  macro  crisis,  (iv)  governance problems  reflected  in  corruption,
dysfunctional institutions and social conflict and are more pervasive than expected, (v) poverty is
persistent and positively correlated with macro crisis, (vi) inequality of income and wealth both
across and within countries is far from declining, on the contrary it seems to have increased in
the last decade or so in Latin America.
Addressing these issues may call for a rethinking of existing development paradigms.
This chapter focuses on one, but important, dimension of the development process-namely
inequality-and  asks how we can move beyond the trap of unequal development.  For that
purpose, this chapter reviews, selectively, two stands of literature pertaining to our subject.  (i)
The recent developments of distributive  justice that provides an inter phase between the political
philosophy of justice  and the  economics of  income distribution  and social welfare;  (ii) the
analytics and empirics of the relationship between inequality and growth.  The underlying idea is
that more egalitarian development is feasible and desirable and that positive complementaries
can be found between distributive justice, social equity and economic development.
Then, this  chapter turns to  social policies.  The discussion continues by  identifying
policies compatible with both rapid growth and more egalitarian development.  Structural social
policies, emergency social safety nets and policies to foster egalitarian access to wealth-creation
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processes and assets (e. g. education, credit, ownership of productive assets).  The scope and
limits  of  targeting, growth  trickle-down  and  private  provision  of  social  services  are  also
reassessed as foundations for social policies behind the Washington Consensus.
I. Poverty and Inequality: What Do We Mean by Social Equity?
A minimalist approach views the reduction of absolute poverty as the only valid concern
for social policy.  Public policy must assure that most of (ideally all) the population is above the
poverty line and that no vulnerable groups (the elderly, children, disabled people) suffer income
deprivation.  As  society reaches a threshold of basic needs satisfied for the population as a
whole, this view says, subsequent inequalities could be considered as largely irrelevant.
The extent to  which the reduction of social inequality is  a valid additional policy objective
(besides poverty reduction) is a complex issue related to at least two considerations: (i) ethical
and moral questions of distributive justice; and, (ii) the impact of income inequality on other
policy  objectives  such  as  sustained economic growth;  overall  development,  socio-political
balance and the ability to conduct public policy.
H.  Theory of Distributive Justice
The theory of  distributive justice',  focuses on the causes  of inequality, and provides
useful philosophical and economic foundations to illuminate discussions on inequality.
'For a recent  treatment  and review  of the theory  of distributive  justice,  see  Roemer  (1996)  and Solimano  (1998).
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2.1  Outside Factors and Personal Responsibility
If observed, income and wealth inequality reflects, to a large extent, differences in initial
endowments of  wealth, talent, family connections, race,  gender -- most  factors beyond the
control of the individual or (in philosophical terms), a set of "morally arbitrary" factors -- then
inequality becomes an ethical issue as key wealth-creating factors are beyond the control of the
individual.  However, observed inequality of  income, wealth, consumption can and do  also
reflect individual differences in effort, ambitions and risk-taking. To the extent that these last set
of elements reflect personal preferences and belong to the realm of "individual responsibility",
they do not, necessarily,  constitute an ethical problem  from the viewpoint of the theory of
distributive justice.  This provides an attractive framework to distinguish between equality of
outcomes (e.g. income or wealth) and equality of opportunities a subject that we will deal below.
This sharp separation between arbitrary and non-arbitrary factors is blurred when it is recognized
that "morally arbitrary" factors (e.g. initial wealth and talents) are likely to  be related to the
formation  of  preferences  and  the  concept  of  individual responsibility;  two  elements that
ultimately guide effort levels and the willingness to take risks.  In fact, one may think that the
perception of a wealthy individual of what constitutes "success in life" (or acceptable levels of
welfare) can be very different for the rich than for the poor.  This circularity between resc.urces
and preferences or between "morally arbitrary factors" and "personal responsibility" makes the
theme of social inequality both exciting and overly complex.
2.2 Alternative Views
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Fundamentally different visions of  society among different schools of thought affect
views on inequality 2. Liberals, Neo-marxists and Libertarians are three main schools of thought
in this regard.  Liberals such as Rawls emphasizes that initial wealth, family background, social
connections and  the  like  can be  unfairly  distributed at the  "birth-lottery".  For  Rawls the
organization of a just society requires a social contract negotiated from a "veil of ignorance" on
the distribution of wealth and other traits among individuals that shape their interests in society.
The idea is that a fair social contract must be independent of background conditions,
otherwise the rules of the game will be biased in favor of those who are more wealthy in society.
A social arrangement is just  for Rawls only if that  arrangement is the best for those
relatively worse-off in society, compared to other alternative social arrangements; this is called
the difference principle 3.
Utilitarianism and welfare  economics provide another analytical base  for liberalism,
different from the social contractuarism of Locke or Rawls.  In contrast to Rawls, utilitarians
avoid judging the justice  of a given distribution of income and wealth in society.  Utilitarians
focus only on maximizing the total sum of personal utilities independently on how these utilities
are  distributed  among  different  members  of  society.  Moreover,  welfare  economics  see
distributive outcomes as the result of voluntary wealth accumulation over generations with the
remuneration of factors of productions given by productivity and effort levels.  This is in contrast
with  the  emphasis  given  to  features  (background  factors)  outside  personal  control  and
responsibility, as stressed by Rawls and the theory of distributive  justice.
2 See Solimano (1998), Chapter 2.
3 See Rawls (1972).
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Another perspective is provided by Neo-marxism. In particular, marxian economics sees
unequal property relations and command of productive wealth in capitalism as the main factors
in generating and reproducing existing inequalities over time 4.  Neo-marxism eschew the idea of
a social contract negotiated from the veil of ignorance.  On the contrary, this view stresses that
the owners of productive wealth design or influence, at the end, institutions that are functional to
their interests rather than to the interests of the less favored in society; hence, the neo-marxian
claim of the unfair nature of capitalist society.  In contrast, Libertarians as Robert Nozick for
example, see the possession of wealth and the right to enjoy its benefits, as a natural right of the
individual, and part of their "self-ownership" that includes the right of private use of productive
assets and natural resources 5.  Libertarians propose a "minimal state" devoid of powers of
taxation that expropriate the fruits of individual effort and risk-taking.
2.3  Concepts of Equality
An important issue relates to the relevant concept of equality 6. A crucial distinction was
made between equality of opportunities and equality of outcomes; as we mentioned already a
person might not be responsible for the set of opportunities he (or she) faces when he (or she) is
born: race, gender, talent, wealth, family background are all predetermined variables for the
individual.  However, the individual is responsible to  transform favorable opportunities into
positive outcomes. Equality in access to wealth-creating factors (e.g. education, credit) is termed
equality of  opportunities.  This  would  be  a  valid  policy  objective  from  the viewpoint  of
distributive  justice.  In contrast, setting the objective of distributive justice in terms of equality of
4 Marx  (1875,  1970).
5 Cohen  (1995).
6 An influential  discussion  in philosophical  economics  on this subject  appears  in Dworkin  (1981).
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outcomes, measured by income or wealth, should not necessarily be a target for social policies,
provided outcomes depend, to a considerable extent, on voluntary choices regarding effort in the
workplace and/or risk-taking attitudes in undertaking entrepreneurial activities.
Making equality of opportunities as the only valid criteria for social policy circumvents
the fact that effort and risk taking are not fully independent of initial background conditions as
mentioned  before.  A  more  "activist"  view  of  equality  would  qualify  the  equality  of
opportunities, and expand the concept in several directions:  First, it would distinguish between
formal and effective equality of opportunities (e.g. education might be an universal right in a
country, but its effective access may depend on the income level of the student); second, it would
call for compensation of those relatively less lucky at the "birth-lottery" (for less talent, for race
and gender, subject to discrimination).  The implementation of compensation schemes will entail
policies of income transfers, affirmative actions and others that go beyond pursuing only equality
of opportunities that equalize access to education, capital but that do not compensate for other
background conditions that are important for future individual success in life 7
7 A full discussion  of these  issues  can be found  in Roemer  (1998).
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Determinants of Income and wealth  Initial assets, talent, gender race, family  Effort levels, risk-taking entrepreneurial
Concept of Equality  status ("outside" factors)  capacities (Personal Responsibility)
x
Equality of opportunities  (Main here)
Equality of opportunities  X  X
(Focus here)  (Focus here)Beyond Unequal  Development
III. Inequality, Growth and Development: Complementarities  and Trade-offs 8
Let's  move  from  the  (complicated) questions  of  distributive justice  to  the  macro
interactions (trade-offs and/or complementarities) between inequality, economic growth, and
long-run development. Is income and wealth inequality the price to  be paid for  accelerated
economic growth? Or, conversely, does inequality retards economic growth? How do inequality
evolves during the course of economic development?  These are key questions that need to be
addressed.
3.1  Growth and Inequality Links
The relationship between economic growth and social inequality at macro level depends
on how the growth process is specified 9. In models of saving-driven growth, if profits-recipients
save  in greater proportion than wage-earners (linear saving functions), a  pattern  of income
distribution more concentrated towards capital will increase national savings and accelerate the
rate of economic growth (all what is saved is invested). This model supported the "conservative"
notion that a more equitable distribution of income retards economic growth through a negative
effect on the national savings ratio; pointing, then, the existence of a trade-off between growth
and equity.
Conversely, neo-Keynesian and endogenous growth theories view growth mainly as an
investment-driven process and emphasize complementarities between growth and social equality.
In Neokeynesian models in which aggregate demand plays a role in the determination of long-
8 This section  draws  on Ch. I and  Ch.  4, Solimano  (1998).
9  See Solimano  (1996).
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run growth, income distribution affects growth through both effective demand (consumption,
investment demand, exports) and the rate of creation of new productive capacity.
A redistribution of income to wage-earners can rise aggregate demand and growth in the
short-term provided positive consumption effects are dominant over  adverse investment and
export effects.  However, that initial increase in aggregate demand will reach supply constraints,
generating inflationary and balance of payments disequilibria that will limit or simply revert
initial income redistributionl'.  In the endogenous growth literature, countries with large personal
income and wealth inequalities invite, through a political mechanism, higher taxation and the
adoption of redistributive policies that depress the profitability of capital, hampering investment,
and slowing-down output growth. The main implication here is that initial inequality is bad for
subsequent growth. Other channels have also been highlighted to  show a negative correlation
between personal income inequality and economic growth, wealth and income: inequality can
lead  to  socio-political instability  and/or  to  populist  economic policies  that  are  ultimately
destabilizing and hamper private capital formation and economic growth. The new literature
combines investment driven growth with a political mechanism transmitting public preferences
for pro-growth versus pro-redistribution policies into actual government policies. The political
mechanism range from elections or referendums to social pressure (e.g. social activism, strikes,
etc.). The causality goes from initial inequality to future growth.  Interestingly, this literature
carries a  "progressive" message that  social inequality  is bad  for  growth,  although identify
10  This  was the case  of the redistributive  policies  pursued  by Allende  in Chile  in the early 1970s,  in Nicaragua  in the
early  1980s,  and in  Perfi  in the mid-1980s.
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redistributive policies  (particularly those that  hamper investmnent)  as  the  cause  why initial
inequality brings subsequent slower growth.
-12-MODEL CLOSURE  ECONOMIC  SOCIO-POLITICAL  CAUSALITY  TYPE OF
MECHANISM  MECHANISM  RELATIONSHIP
INEQUALITY/GROW
TH
Models/Theories  Saving  Investment  Through  Through  Median  Bargaining  Income  Growth to  Inverse  Direct
Driving  Driven  Classic  Profit-  Votar  Power  Distribution  Income
Growth  Growth  Saving  ability and  Capitalist  Distribution
Function  Investment  Workers
Classic  X  X  X  X
Solow  X  _  _  _  __  _  __X_  _  _  _
Kaldor  X  X  X  X
New Growth
Theory/Endogenous
Policy  X  X  X  X  X
Wage-led and  ?
Profit-led Growth
Theories  X  X  X  X
Neo-Marxian





Accumuation  X  X  X  X  _  X
Fuente:  A. Solimano  (1998)Beyond Unequal  Development
3.2 Empirical Evidence
The empirics of this inequality-growth literature is largely dominated by cross section or
panel regression analysis".  In general, several empirical studies tend to support the hypothesis
that inequality (an explanatory variable) has a negative, often statistically significant, effect on
the rate of output growth (the dependent variable in the regressions) after controlling by variables
such as initial per capita income, levels of education, and political participation.  This result
seems to hold for separate samples of developed and less developed economies (see Persson and
Tabellini,  1994) and  is  robust  to  alternative  functional  forms  of- the  distribution-growth
relationship and different measures of inequality (share of top quintil, Gini coefficient, Theil
coefficient, see Clarke 1992).  However, not all studies agree on this.  For example, Fishlow
(1995) shows that the negative correlation between inequality and growth fails to be detected
when a dummy for Latin America, a region with high inequality, is included in the regressions.
The influence of the political regime (democracies or non-democracies) on the inequality and
growth nexus seems less on agreement.  While Persson and Tabellini (1994) found that the
negative relationship between inequality and growth holds only for democracies, Clarke (1992)
and Alesina and Rodrik, (1994) found no significant impact of the political regime on the sign
and significance of the distribution parameter in the growth regressions.  It is worth mentioning
that all the models tested including the economic and political mechanisms, are reduced forms.
A structural test of the political mechanism (median voter) proposed in the theory is hard to find.
A recent World Bank study by Deininger and Squire (1995b) shows that most of the
recent test  of the  negative relationship between initial  inequality and  subsequent  economic
growth are based on income distribution data of limited coverage and of little cross-country and
It is hard  to find  yet, time-series,  historically-oriented,  studies  of distribution  and  growth  in this literature.
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temporal comparability.  Moreover, the results obtained in those previous studies have to be
carefully interpreted as they are estimates from reduced forms of a structural model in which
other  variables  may  determine  the joint  co-movement of  growth  and  income  distribution
observed in the data.  Moreover, in a related study Liu, Squire, and Zou (1995) using recent and
more consistent data on income distribution show that income inequality is relatively stable
within countries and over time, in stark contrast with the behavior of the rates of growth of GDP
that do change rapidly and are characterized by very low persistence. These two studies strongly
caution on the accuracy of the empirical tests of the new growth theory on income inequality.
3.3 Inequality and Development Links: The Kuznets Curve
The relationship between development levels, (proxied by the level of per capita income
and income) inequality (measured by the Gini coefficients or the share between top and bottom
quintils or decils) postulated by Simon Kuznets have been subject to  controversy and empirical
testing for a long time. As it is well known, the Kuznets hypothesis states the existence of a non-
linear relationship between per capita income and an index of income inequality, reflected in an
inverted  U-shape  curve;  income  inequality  worsens  at  the  initial  stages  of  development,
characterized by low per capital income levels, improving thereafter as income per person rises.
The Kuznets mechanisms focused on the shift from a surplus-labor agricultural sector paying
subsistence wages to a modem industrial sector with higher wages during the initial stages of
development. Later on, inequality declines due to a narrowing of wage differentials as the pool
of labor surplus is exhausted and the skills profile of the work-force gets upgraded through
formal education and learning by doing during the course of development.  The causality in
Kuznets goes from development levels to  inequality, and the sign of the relationship evolves
over historical time.
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3.4  Empirical Evidence
The  Kuznets  curve  spurted  a  vast  empirical  effort  devoted  at  testing  its  shape,
determining its robustness to the selection of countries and time periods, and detecting turning
points in which income distribution starts improving along the development process.
The empirical cross section work of Ahluwalia (1976), Lindert and Williamson (1985),
Adelman and Robinson  (1989), Bourgignon and Morrison (1990) and others tend to  give a
(qualified) support to  the  existence of  the Kuznets  curve.  In  addition,  for  cross  country
regressions, the inequality portion of the Kuznets curve tends to  be more unstable than the
portion of declining inequality (see figure la).  Since the inequality part of the curve comprises
countries in a range of lower to moderate income per capital levels, the relationship is more
unstable for these countries'2. In contrast, it seems a more established fact that inequality tends
to decline for countries at the intermediate and high levels of per-capita income 13 (see figure lb).
However, studies for individual countries in Latin America (Colombia, Brazil, Argentina) and
for  Asian countries  are reported to  conform to  the  Kuznets curve  pattern  (see  Fields  and
Jakubson, 1993) with a comparison of the impact of inequality on growth in Latin America and
East Asia conducted in Birdsall and Sabot (1994).
Two recent World Bank studies (Deininger and Squire, 1995a, 1995b) have produced a
new  expanded data-base  on  income distribution  of  improved coverage  and  consistency to
reevaluate existing studies of the Kuznets curve.  These World Bank studies, pooling cross-
12 A recent  paper,  Field  and Jakubson  (1993),  finds  a reversal  of the Kuznets  curve  using  a "fixed  effects"  model  that
allows  for different  countries  to lie on Kuznets  curves  with  the same  shape but with different  intercepts.  However,
in pooled  models  the standard  Kuznets  curve  is maintained.
13 This  does not rule out changes  in the levels  of inequality  even  in high  per capita  income  countries  as the result of
changes  in economic  policies. This seems  to be the case for the US under President  Reagan  and the UK under
Prime  Minister  Thatcher,  in which  inequality  went up, see Krugman  (1993).
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section with time series data, show that the Kuznets curve holds only for a very small set of
countries (10 percent of the sample) and that  in general no statistical significant relationship
between the level of income and inequality is found for over 75 percent of the sample.  The
"universal Kuznets curve" fails to be detected in the data.  These recent studies thus, cast doubts
on the existence and robustness of the Kuznets curve.  More research is needed, to settle the
confronting new World Bank and previous evidence on the Kuznets curve. Anyway, there seems
to be that as countries move up in the income per-capita ladders, inequality tends to decline. An
important practical question is at what levels of per-capita income (US$5,000?, US$8,000?)
income inequality start  declining and  how public policies  can help  accelerate this  process.
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IV. Policy Issues:
4.1 Growth  and Equality. Can they match?
A  central  policy  question  is  whether public  policies  oriented  to  improve  income
distribution can be  compatible with  high and  sustained growth?  The macro-growth models
reviewed here, offer arguments to support either "conservative" views that redistribution deters
growth as well as "progressive" views in which redistribution and growth are compatible and,
even, mutually reinforcing complementary policy goals.  Analytically, the conservative view
finds support in two models.  In a  full-capacity, growing economy, income redistribution to
relatively low-savings groups can depress the aggregate savings ratio therefore leading to  a
decline in growth. In investment-driven models, redistributive policies that entail higher taxation
and/or  regulation  depress  privately  appropriated  returns  on  human  capital  and  physical
investment and harm growth.
Are thus we condemned to accept social inequality as the price for high growth policies?
Is the "conservative equilibrium" inescapable? Not necessarily. Three arguments are in order
here. First, the  message of  the Kuznets  curve, is  that  the  growth process  itself  would be
"equalizing" beyond certain threshold of income per-capita, (the turning point of the curve),
making the fruits of progress and development available to a greater portion of the population.
Second, beyond trickle-down, policy intervention in assuring broad-social access to education
(and to credit) can have a  big pay-off.  The market-equilibrium can yield substantial under
investment, particular in human capital, for those at the bottom part of the income distribution
that cannot pay for their education and face very limited access to capital markets.  The rewards
in terms of accelerated growth of education-widening are bound to be sizeable.  Third, a more
equitable distribution of income and economic opportunities also contribute to social peace and
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political stability, key ingredients in a policy framework conducive to investment, innovation and
growth.  Ultimately, social equity  and economic growth can go hand with hand  if properly
articulated to respect some key binding economic and political constraints in society.
4.2  Social policies and the Washington Consensus:  Scope and Limits
In line with market-based economic reform, during the last decade countries have moved
away from traditional social policies that often involved across-the-board (to large segments of
the population) subsidies on basic food-stuff, public utilities such as water, electricity; besides
universal access to education and health services.  For a while, in many countries these policies
enabled  considerable reduction  in  analphabetism, substantial  educational  upgrading  of  the
middle class and lower income groups and improvement in health indicators.  However, these
policies eventually led to a growing fiscal burden and they often benefited also higher income
groups.  The social policies implicit in the Washington Consensus (in fact this consensus is
criticized for the lack of explicit social policies, see Stiglitz, 1998) tailored to a market-based
policy framework rest on the following principles:
Economic growth should be the main engine for poverty reduction and improvement in
living standards (the "trickle down" effect).
Relative prices  and  the  market  mechanism  must  guide resource  allocation  and  the
incentives to  save  and invest.  Social policies must  avoid affecting the relative price
structure of the economy through subsidies and indirect taxation.  Price controls of basic
food stuff must be eliminated.  Marginal cost pricing must dictate user-fees for public
utilities.
Social policies  must  be  explicitly  focused  on--or  targeted to--  the  most  vulnerable
segments of the  population  (the elderly,  children, the handicapped) and  the poorest
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groups in society (rural population, workers in the informal sector, families in extreme
poverty in urban dwellings).
Private sector participation in the provision and management of basic social services such
as education and  health must be  encouraged through privatization and/or concession
schemes.
*  The explicit objective of social policy is poverty reduction.  Correcting large income or
wealth inequalities is not an explicit policy objective.
A full evaluation of the implementation and results of social policies based on these
principles is beyond the scope of this chapter but a few observations are in order.
As mentioned above, economic  growth  is seen as the main vehicle for poverty reduction
and  improvement in  living  standards.  There is  no  question that  economic growth is  very
important. Growth  directly generates employment and real income to labor market participants
and  provides  --through  tax receipts--  fiscal revenues to  the  state  to  finance  social policy.
Moreover, a growing economy is bound to ease distributional conflict as competing claims are
over a  "growing pie" rather than a zero-sum game. However economic growth also presents
limitations as a mechanism to enable poverty reduction and improving living standards. First, the
potential for poverty-reduction of growth depends not  only the level  of growth but  also its
composition: it has to  be labor-intensive, and  benefit more unskilled labor.  The spacial  (or
regional) composition of production must favor more poorer regions than others. Second, GDP,
or any aggregate output measure, is a yardstick that omits distributive consideration' 4. Third,
output growth does not directly reach some vulnerable groups such as the elderly, the children,
the handicapped, those in rural areas in subsistence agriculture that are outside the labor market
4 See Sen (1987) and Anand and Sen (1996).
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and form part of the dependent population.  Fourth, GDP statistics often under-report informal
sector activities in  which lower  income groups are involved.  Family-based or public-based
redistribution is thus needed to reach these segments. Fifth, GDP is a commodity or "opulence-
based" measure of economic welfare that does not include non-market goods (such as political
freedom, the psychological value of belonging to  community, etc.) and  bads (environmental
degradation, crime, urban congestion) that also centrally affect human well-being.  Sixth, unlike
traditional social policies that had a political constituency in the urban working-class, in the
strong unions of the middle class (teachers, doctors) and in other interest groups, the new social
policies have as beneficiaries poor and vulnerable groups with a weak voice and feeble political
organization; this creates tenuous political incentives for active poverty reduction beyond that
provided by economic growth and may be an important factor behind chronic poverty.
Another main piece of the new strategy of social policies is targeting.  The emphasis on
precisely defining the beneficiary groups is a reaction to social policies that often reached, at a
high fiscal cost, the non-poor (the middle class and the rich).  A basic principle of targeting is to
focus social policy on the poor avoiding reaching the non-poor 15. In this context,  targeting  is
more effective in terms of reaching the "real" poor, and at a substantially reduced fiscal cost than
untargeted, broad-based, social policy.
However targeting is not problem free either. First, targeting makes the beneficiary a
passive  "victim" rather than  an  active agent with  policy responses  and  choices' 6. Second,
informational and incentives problems are serious. Delimiting the beneficiaries and their poverty
features that needs to be addressed is not easy (e.g. an information problem).  Reaching with the
15 See  Cornia and  Stwart (1996) on an  interesting discussion of two types of  "errors" in targeting, the E-error
(excessive coverage, e.g. reaching the non-poor) and the F-error (failure to reach to poor).
16 See Sens (1996) on this.
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administrative apparatus of the state the most vulnerable groups cannot be taken for granted
everywhere.  Moreover, some targeted groups have a more active political voice than others,
biasing the transfer of resources to them (e.g. an incentive problem).  Political favoritism and
clientelism of certain groups can lead to the failure to reach the most needy.
Private-sector provision and delivery of social services such as education and health is
another component of a market-based approach to social policy.  Private sector involvement in
the social sectors can help to release financial and human resources of the state in order to focus
its effort on the lower income groups. Privatization of social services seems to work well in
terms of an adequate provision  -- in terms of quantity and quality-- of education and health
services for high income and the upper middle class that can afford to pay for the services
privately provided. However, for low income  groups and  segments of  the middle class the
situation is different. As their ability to  pay is low they depend on demand subsidies--e.g. a
voucher system-- for getting access to high-cost, privately-provided social services or else they
have to be served by the state. In addition, in the case of private health systems, providers often
put clauses that exclude the elderly , the chronically ill and those with large families from access
to these programs. Nevertheless, these are precisely the most vulnerable groups that need most
protection.
The co-existence of a  system  of relatively poor  state-provided education and  health
system along with a modem and affluent private system, creates serious incentives and equity
problems.  School  teachers,  university  professors, physicians  and  paramedicals  often have
considerable incentives to work in the high paid, private sector, decapitalizing the state-sector.
Moreover, while some citizens will have access to  first-class education and  health services,
others will face impoverished, education, and health services provided by the state.  A main
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challenge is how to  guarantee good quality, cost-efficient, social services for the large groups
segments of the population that cannot afford to pay for the services delivered in the private
system and that therefore have to be served by the state.
4.3  Policies to Match Growth, Social Equity and Poverty Reduction.
Policies oriented to increase individual productivity and earning capacities are crucial to
match economic growth with a better income distribution and less poverty.  Education is a clear
case; it endows people with greater human capital and promotes social mobility.
It matters also the quality of education and the extent to which the poor has access to it.
However, education is a supply side policy that, to be effective, requires a corresponding level of
demand for human resources, which in turn depends on the level of effective demand and the
pace of growth.  A bad equilibrium is to have pools of educated and well-qualified people that is
unemployed or underemployed.
Health-related policies are also essential for building up human capital.  An improvement
in health capacities reduce people's vulnerabilities and boost the quality of life.
Broadening and democratizing the access to credit is also an equalizing, productivity-
enhancing mechanism as many latent productive projects identified and developed by small scale
entrepreneurs and households fail to be implemented by lack of credit and finance.  Policies of
asset distribution regarding land reform and broad-based ownership of productive capital, say
after privatization, are also worth considering.
The recent literature on  "inequality harms growth" stresses that redistributive policies
penalize private investment and growth. This calls attention on how redistribution is carried out.
Capital taxation can depress profits rates and lead to slower investment; the level of taxation has
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to be monitored as high taxation invite  evasion besides hampering  savings, investment, and
growth. However, investment is also very sensitive to uncertainty and socio-political instability.
In  that perspective, policies  oriented to  reduce  large  social inequalities  can have  a
significant  "social-peace  dividend"  that  is  essential  to  foster  a  framework  conducive  to
investment and growth.
The promotion of economic growth as a basic engine for better living standards and
poverty reduction has to be maintained, but complemented with a greater awareness of the limits
of  commodity-based welfare.  A  healthy  physical  environment, economical  and  physical
security,  civic  participation  and  political  freedom  are  all  very  important  dimensions  of
meaningful human self-realization beyond the consumption of goods and services.
In addition, paternalistic social policies have to  be avoided. This is  a defect  of both
traditional social policies with broad-based subsidization and also of targeting and its passive
approach of unreactive beneficiaries.  A web of community and non-governmental organizations
that have appeared in recent years in many countries are a useful bridge between individual
atomization  and  the  state  (with  its  limited  administrative and  financial  capacities).  These
intermediate organizations can and do play an important role in the design and management of
social policy.
Private provision of some social services can serve an useful role  for higher income
groups. It can be also a source of innovation and best practice that should permeate state-based
provision of social services. In developing countries it is clear that the vast  majority of the
population needs access to  either subsidized or state provided education and health  services.
How the two systems can co-exist and how to improve the quality of the services provided by the
state are important open questions.
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Finally, most of these policies can be termed as "structural social policies" envisaged in
the framework of a growing economy.  The situation is different when macroeconomic crisis
lead to higher unemployment, decline in real wages and incomes, particularly for the poor and
vulnerable.  In  this  case  social  safety  nets  are  needed.  The  institutional  and  financial
requirements of putting in place emergency social problems are often less burdensome than those
of  structural social policies.  Social safety nets  often  involve the  provision  of  emergency
employment to those that lose jobs after fiscal retrenchment, the delivery of food and medicines
to children in schools and guarantee minimum income support, among other policies.
Concluding Remarks
Some of the main topics and conclusions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
*  Social policies in developing countries in the last decade or so have been defined almost
exclusively in  terms  of  poverty  reduction.  A  fresh  look  at  the  issue  of  income
distribution and the reduction of social inequality as valid policy targets beyond, simply,
poverty reduction is needed.
*  The modem theory of distributive justice  distinguishes between  "outside" or morally
arbitrary factors (gender, race, initial assets, talent) and "personal responsibility" elements
(effort, risk-taking attitudes) in shaping the level of income, wealth and welfare of the
individual in society.  Social inequality is a reflection of individual differences in these
two set of wealth-creating factors.
Any  meaningful  social  policy  needs  defining  a  concept  of  equality.  Equality  of
opportunities (e.g. to education, to bank credit) to be effective, rather than formal, needs
some complementary actions.  Further concepts such as equality of outcomes calls for
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compensating mechanisms for poor endowments of useful traits (e.g. talent, gender) at
the "birth-lottery".
*  The  new  theories  of  endogenous  growth  stress  the  existence  of  complementarities
between social equity and growth.  Provided that inequality engender social conflict,
invite taxation of physical investment and induce economic populism, we can conclude
that social inequality hampers economic growth.  The empirical evidence based on time
series and  cross section seems to  support, with  qualifications, the  adverse effect  of
inequality on growth.
*  The Kuznets curve, linking development levels and income distribution suggests a trend
towards lower  inequality after  "intermediate" levels of per-capita  income  have been
reached.  Assuming that  the  Kuznets  curve holds,  something  in  dispute  now, it  is
important to know plausible levels of per-capita income for which a decline in inequality
is to be expected and the mechanisms that bring about that decline.
*  The "Washington Consensus"  has supported  social policies  that  rely on  three  main
pillars: growth-led poverty reduction, targeting, and private sector participation in the
delivery of social services. Some loose ends of this strategy are: a) biased growth patterns
in favor of skilled labor and non-labor factors of production, b) exclusion of vulnerable
groups that do not  derive income from the market process, c)  excessive reliance on
commodity-based growth for human development that  encompass also  environmental
considerations, civic participation in public decision-making and grass-roots democracy,
d)  political  manipulation  of beneficiaries  and  weak  institutional  capacities to  reach
targeted groups, e) excessive differences in the quality of the social services provided by
the private  sector and received by  high income groups (and the upper  middle class)
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compared to the modest or poor quality of social services delivered by the state and
received by low income groups.
*  A catalog of structural social policies oriented to promote equitable development must
include the provision of broad based, good quality education and health services, broader
access to credit by low-income households and small scale producers, and egalitarian
access to land and ownership of the capital stock (say after privatization).
Social  safety nets  are  needed  in  periods  of  macroeconomic crisis  leading  to  high
unemployment, cuts in real wages and decline in real incomes of the poor.  The social
safety nets  may comprise  policies  such  as  emergency employment  programs, food
distribution to children and vulnerable groups and schemes of minimum income support.
Austerity programs  without  social  safety nets  impose undue  costs to  the  poor,  the
vulnerable and the politically weak, making fiscal retrenchment difficult to implement
and socially regressive.
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